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SURVEY: WOMEN AND 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
This survey of California law, a regular feature of 
the Women's Law Forum, summarizes recent Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court and Court of Appeal deci-
sions of special importance to women. 
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I. CONTRACT LAW 
A. COHABITATION CONTRACT 
1. A gay couple's unwritten cohabitation contract is en-
forceable to the extent it is based on non-sexual 
serv£ces. 
Whorton v. Dillingham, 202 Cal. App. 3d 447, 248 Cal. 
Rptr. 405 (1988), review denied. Whorton v. Dillingham ex-
tended the enforceability of an unmarried couple's marriage-like 
contract in two major respects. First, the Whorton court applied 
the Marvin l doctrine to a couple of the same sex. Second, it 
found that the couple's mutual promises of sexual services were 
severable and thus did not invalidate the remainder of their 
contract. 
Whorton and Dillingham, a gay couple, lived together for 
seven years under the terms of an oral cohabitation contract. 
Whorton quit college to work full time as Dillingham's chauf-
feur, bodyguard, secretary, and business partner. In exchange, 
Dillingham promised Whorton support for life and a one-half in-
terest in all property they acquired. 
The couple also promised to be lovers. They specifically 
agreed that any portion of the contract found legally unenforce-
able would be severable.2 
When Dillingham terminated the relationship, Whorton 
sued claiming property rights. The trial court sustained 
Dillingham's demurrer and dismissed the action on the ground 
the contract was unenforceable as expressly and inseparably 
based on sexual services.3 Whorton appealed, and the court of 
appeal reversed.' 
1. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) (cohab-
itation contract found enforceable). 
2. Whorton, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 450, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 407. 
3. Id., 248 Cal. Rptr. at 406. 
4.Id. 
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As a gay couple, Whorton and Dillingham had been denied 
by statute the right to a formal marriage. II Nevertheless, the 
court of appeal did not invalidate their use of a marriage-like 
contract to confer on each other mahy of the rights and respon-
sibilities of marriage. 
As significant as Whorton may be for thousands of gay and 
lesbian couples, the court relegated its rationale to a succinct 
footnote: "Dillingham does not assert Marvin is inapplicable to 
same-sex partners, and we see no legal basis to make a 
distinction. "6 
Prior to Marvin, most courts had reasoned that the agree-
ment of any unmarried couple, gay or straight, to share their 
lives was the same as any other "contract to pay for the per-
formance of sexual services, [which] is, in essence, an agreement 
for prostitution and unlawful for that reason."7 The Marvin 
court held that cohabitors are competent to contract and that 
their contracts are enforceable to the extent they do not " 'rest 
upon illicit meretricious consideration ... .' "8 
Five years after Marvin, the court of appeal in Jones v. 
Daly9 refused to award an interest in his partner's estate to a 
gay survivor under a cohabitors' agreement. lO The Marvin doc-
trine did not apply, the court decided, because the agreement 
did not" 'rest[] upon plaintiff's acting as Daly's traveling com-
panion, housekeeper or cook as distinguished from acting as his 
lover. The latter service forms an inseparable part of the consid-
eration for the agreement and renders it unenforceable in its 
entirety.' "11 
5. California's marriage law was amended in 1977 to exclude same-sex couples spe-
cifically: "Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man 
and a woman . ... " CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1983) (amendment emphasized). 
6. Whorton, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 452 n.1, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 408 n.1. 
7. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825. 
8. Whorton, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 451, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 407 (quoting Marvin, 18 Cal. 
3d at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825). 
9. 122 Cal. App. 3d 500, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1981). 
10. Whorton, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 454-55, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 410. 
11. [d. at 455, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 410 (quoting Jones, 122 Cal. App. at 509, 176 Cal. 
Rptr. at 134) (emphasis omitted). 
5
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The Whorton court painstakingly distinguished Jones, de-
spite the remarkable similarity of the facts of the two cases. It 
observed that cohabitation agreements almost invariably con-
template "a mutual sexual relationship."12 That fact, by itself, 
could not invalidate such agreements, because Marvin had ruled 
that" 'even if sexual services are part of the contractual consid-
eration, any severable portion of the contract supported by inde-
pendent consideration will still be enforced.' "13 
Thus, severability of the sexual component of the contract 
was the key issue in Whorton, l' and three arguments persuaded 
the Whorton court to reach the conclusion that the sexual com-
ponent was severable. First, Whorton had alleged that the par-
ties to his contract had agreed to the severability of any portion 
found unenforceable. 111 Jo'nes had not. IS 
Second, although the plaintiffs in both cases had promised 
to serve as "companion," Whorton had also contracted to pro-. 
vide an itemized list of what the court construed as business ser-
vices: "chauffeur, bodyguard, secretary, partner and business 
counselor."17 Jones' services had been described in his complaint 
as" 'lover, companion, homemaker, traveling companion, house-
keeper and cook,' "18 summed up by the Whorton court as 
"household duties." The Whorton court distinguished 
Whorton's business services, "those for which monetary compen-
sation ordinarily would be anticipated," from Jones' household 
or homemaking services, which it considered "normally incident 
to the state of cohabitation itself. illS 
If the role of "companion" had been classified as a home-
making service, it still should not have tainted the contract. Re-
calling Marvin, the Whorton court determined that even 
promises to serve as homemaker are not necessarily so inter-
twined with the sexual relationship as to be inseparable. Marvin 
had noted that" '[a] promise to perform homemaking services 
12. Id. at 451, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 407. 
13. Id. (quoting Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 672, 557 P.2d at 114, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 823). 
14. Id. at 452, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 408. 
15. Id. at 450, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 407. 
16. Id. at 455, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 410. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. (quoting Jones, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 505, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 131). 
19. Id. 
6
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is, of course, a lawful and adequate consideration for a contract 
, "20 
Ultimately, therefore, the distinction between business and 
homemaking services did not determine the outcome in 
Whorton. In the opinion of this court, no promise made by 
Whorton except his promise to be Dillingham's lover could have 
invalidated the couple's contract. 
The third severability argument considered by the Whorton 
court rested on an elementary fact of life and rule of contract. 21 
A promise to be lovers must be made by both parties, not just 
one. Moreover, lawful sections of contracts are severable from 
unlawful sections when" 'the parties' performances can be ap-
portioned in corresponding pairs ... .' "22 The court concluded: 
"[B]y itemizing the mutual promises to engage in sexual activ-
ity, Whorton has not precluded the trier of fact from finding 
those promises are the consideration for each other and indepen-
dent of the bargained for consideration for Whorton's 
employment. "23 
Briefly discussed and dismissed by the Whorton court were 
the defendant's claims that the contract was barred by the stat-
ute of frauds and the statute of limitations and that it wa's a 
labor contract terminable at will.24 Relying on Marvin, the court 
noted that agreements between non marital partners have been 
expressly upheld, despite the fact they are usually oral, on the 
theory of promissory estoppel. 2Ii 
As to whether the contract was time-barred, the time begins 
to run on a Marvin-type contract when one party ends the rela-
tionship26 and continues for two years if the claim is based on an 
20. [d. at 451, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 407 (quoting Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 670 n.5, 557 P.2d 
at 113 n.5, 134 Cal. Rptr: at 822 n.5). 
21. [d. at 452-54, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 408-10. 
22. [d. at 452-53, 248 Cal. Rptr. 408 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 183 (1979)). 
23. [d. at 454, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 410. 
24. [d. at 456-57, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 410-11. 
25. [d. at 456, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 410-11. 
26. [d. (citing Estate of Fincher, 119 Cal. App. 3d 343, 352, 174 Cal. Rptr. 18,23-24 
(1981)). 
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unwritten contract, three years for fraud, and four years if based 
on equitable grounds.27 
A cohabitation contract, the court ruled, is not a contract 
for employment terminable at will under the Labor Code. In-
stead, it governs "how two nonmarital partners have agreed to 
regulate their economic affairs. "28 Either party may terminate 
the partnership, and the issue for the court is distribution of 
assets.29 
Whorton should prove to be a landmark decision not only 
for lesbian and gay couples denied the right to marry, but also 
for vast numbers of unmarried heterosexual couples. In the re-
cent case of Elden v. Sheldon,30 the California Supreme Court 
noted an 800 percent increase in unmarried cohabitation in the 
census prior to Marvin and almost another tripling between 
1970 and 1984.31 
Women especially stand to benefit from courts' increasing 
willingness to enforce unwritten cohabitation contracts. 
Whorton builds on a foundation laid in 1976 by the California 
Supreme Court with Marvin and by the Oregon Supreme Court 
with Latham v. Latham,32 both of which upheld women's claims 
under heterosexual agreements. The Whorton court found 
Latham of "particular significance" because, as in Whorton, 
"the sexual aspect of the agreement appeared on the face of the 
complaint. "33 
The California court in Marvin observed that "prior deci-
sions which had denied relief to the homemaking partner . . . 
rested upon a policy of punishing persons guilty of cohabitation 
without marriage."3. The Oregon court in Latham reasoned: 
"The application of the principle that such a contract will not be 
27. [d. at 456-57, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 411. 
28. [d. at 457, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 411. 
29. [d. 
30. 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988). 
31. [d. at 273 n.3, 758 P.2d at 585 n.3, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 258 n.3. 
32. 547 P.2d 144 (Or. 1976). 
33. Whorton, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 453-54, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 409. 
34. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 680, 557 P.2d at 119, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 828. 
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enforced has often resulted·in the male keeping the assets accu-
mulated in the relationship and the female being deprived of 
what she jointly accumulated. "311 
An English commentator recently decried the harm done to 
women unless cohabitation contracts are enforced: "A woman's 
place is often still in the home, but if she stays there, she will 
acquire no interest in it."36 
The rights of unmarried cohabiting partners are not invaria-
bly given the same protection as those of married partners. 
Elden, for example, rejected the claims of the survivor of a het-
erosexual unmarried couple for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress and loss of consortium, limiting such recovery to mar-
ried partners only.37 
Acknowledging "that society benefits from the stability and 
structure provided by the institution of marriage,"38 the dissent 
insisted: " 'The state's policy in favor of marriage, however, does 
not imply a corresponding policy against nonmarit~l relation-
ships.' Nor does it imply that the values underlying the state's 
interest in marriage flourish only within the confines of that 
institution. "39 
Lesbians and gays are particularly vulnerable, the dissent 
noted. "Clearly the state's interest in marriage is not advanced 
by precluding recovery to couples who could not in any case 
choose marriage. The categorical exclusion of same-sex couples 
particularly highlights the injustice of an approach that recog-
nizes only those commitments ratified by the state."40 
Although Elden demonstrated the persistent inequality in 
legal standing between married and unmarried cohabiting 
35. Latham, 547 P.2d at 147. 
36. Eekeillar, A Woman's Place-A Conflict Between Law and Social Values, 1987 
CONY. & PROP. LAW. (n.s.) 93,94. 
37. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254. 
38. [d. at 281, 758 P.2d at 591, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (Broussard, J., dissenting) 
(citing Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831). 
39. [d. (Broussard, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 34 Cal. 3d 1, 14, 663 P.2d 904, 913, 192 Cal. 
Rptr. 135, 143 (1983) (Broussard, J., dissenting)). 
40. [d. at 282 n.2, 758 P.2d at 592 n.2, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 264 n.2 (Broussard, J., 
dissenting). 
9
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couples, Whorton extended the enforceability of cohabitation 
contracts significantly beyond Marvin. Whorton has breathed 
fresh hope into the search for equal protection among all couples 
who call themselves a family, married or not, gay or straight. 
Mary Ratcliff* 
II. CRIMINAL LAW 
A. CHILD ABUSE 
1. Felony child abuse is not inherently dangerous to 
human life and therefore not an appropriate predicate 
to the application of the felony-murder rule. 
People v. Caffero, 207 Cal. App. 3d 678, 255 Cal. Rptr. 22 
(1989), review denied. In People v. Caffero, the California court 
of appeal affirmed dismissal of a murder charge against the par-
ents of a seventeen-day-old infant. Although the baby died of 
infection brought on by severe diaper rash, the court found no 
evidence that the parents knew their failure to care hygienically 
for their baby endangered her life. The court held that felony 
child abuse is not inherently dangerous to human life and there-
fore not an appropriate predicate to the application of the fel-
ony-murder rule. 
Christina Caffero was born prematurely on December 17, 
1986, and went home from the hospital five days later in the 
care of her parents, defendants Jay and Tina Caffero. On De-
cember 31, after nine days at home, the baby seemed 
" 'jumpy.' "1 
Her mother called the hospital emergency room for advice. 
She was told to call her own doctor or, if the situation was a 
• J.D., 1990, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. Caifero, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 681, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 23. 
10
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"'real emergency,'" to bring the baby to the hospital. It was 
New Year's Eve.2 
The baby's mother waited until the next day when her 
mother-in-law could see Christina. The grandmother said the 
baby had nothing more serious than colic and a "'diaper 
rash.' "3 
Defendants took their baby to the emergency room on Janu-
ary 2 at 10:40 p.m. Observing the baby's "good facial color" and 
only slightly elevated temperature of 98.9 degrees, the triage 
nurse decided her condition was" 'non-urgent.' "4 
At midnight, the nurse looked at Christina again. The 
baby's skin had become pale, and the nurse noticed sores on her 
anus and foot and fecal staining on her skin.6 Christina's tem-
perature had dropped to 93.2 degrees, and her blood pressure 
was extemely low. Despite intensive treatment, she died hours 
later of Escherichia coli (E.coli), an overwhelming bacterial 
infection.6 
The magistrate held Jay and Tina Caff'ero for felony child 
abuse7 but declined to hold them for murder. The magistrate 
made no findings of fact. 8 
Four medical doctors testified that the infection had en-
tered Christina's blood stream through a perianal sore. They 
said such sores, which take several days to develop, are caused 
by prolonged contact with fecal matter when diapers are not reg-
ularly changed.9 
Two of the doctors, both specialists in pediatric intensive 





6. Id., 255 Cal. Rptr. at 23·24. 
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(l) (West 1988). For the relevant parts of the statute, see 
infra text accompanying note 19. 
8. Caffero, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 682, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 24. 
9. Id. at 681·82, 685, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 24, 26. 
11
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seen, at least for a baby her age. IO The experts agreed that once 
E. coli is introduced into the blood stream, it can overwhelm a 
baby's entire system within a day or two. ll In Christina's case, 
her condition became grave a short time after she arrived at the 
hospital, and she died a few hours later.l2 
Following the magistrate's examination, Christina's parents 
were charged by the state with both felony child abuse and mur-
der. The court of appeal affirmed the superior court's dismissal 
of the murder charge because it found no evidence of malice. 
Defendants had shown neither express malice nor implied mal-
ice, "a subjective awareness that their acts or omissions endan-
gered the life of their child."ls 
The felony-murder rule originally made the commission of 
any felony resulting in unintended death a predicate for mur-
der.14 Many American jurisdictions have narrowed the rule, and 
some have abolished it, as has England. IIi California has limited 
the rule by requiring that the underlying felony be inherently 
dangerous to human life. Ie 
Whether the particular felony is an appropriate predicate to 
murder is determined by examining the elements of the felony 
in the abstract, rather than by examining the facts of the case.17 
Furthermore, the statutory definition of the felony must be 
viewed as a whole. The Caffero court ruled, "If the statute may 
be violated by conduct which does not endanger human life, it is 
not inherently dangerous to human life."18 
10. [d. at 685, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 26. 
11. [d. at 682, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 24. 
12. [d. at 685, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 26. 
13. [d. at 684-85, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26. 
14. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI', CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5, at 622 (2d ed. 1986). 
15. [d. § 7.5(h), at 640. 
16. Caifero, 207 Ca. App. 3d at 682, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 24 (citing People v. Ireland, 70 
Cal. 2d 522, 538, 450 P.2d 580, 589, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188, 197 (1969)); see also W. LAFAVE & 
A. SCOTI', supra note 14, § 7.5(b), at 623 n.10 ("People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 44 
Cal. Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130 (1965) ('The felony-murder doctrine ascribes malice afore-
thought to the felon who kills in the perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony')."). 
17. Caifero, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 683, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 24; see also W. LAFAVE & A. 
SCOTI', supra note 14, § 7.5(b), at 624. 
18. Caifero, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 683, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (citing People v. Bur-
roughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 830-31, 678 P.2d 894, 898-99, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319, 323-24 (1984)). 
12
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The felony child abuse statute states in relevant part: 
" 'Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to 
produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits 
any child to suffer ... is punishable by imprisonment ... in the 
state prison .... ' "19 
The court found that the statute may be violated by con-
duct that is not life threatening. Death and great bodily harm 
are treated as discrete risks. An injury such as a fractured limb, 
the court noted, may be deemed '~great bodily harm." However, 
it is unlikely to endanger life, even the life of an infant.20 
Other courts of appeal have sustained second degree felony-
murder convictions on the assumption that violation of the fel-
ony child abuse statute is a felony inherently dangerous to 
human life.21 The Caffero court concluded, however: 
We are not unaware of the shocking incidence of 
child abuse in our society nor indifferent to the 
special need of helpless children for the full mea-
sure of protection which the law can afford. Nev-
ertheless, . . . we are impelled to the conclusion 
that felony child abuse is not inherently danger-
ous to human life within the meaning of the fel-
ony-murder rule.22 
The court next addressed whether the evidence in this case 
could support the charge of murder, without regard to the fel-
ony-murder rule. Murder requires malice aforethought. The Caf-
feros were charged not with express malice, but with malice that 
implies an " 'abandoned and malignant heart.' "23 This kind of 
murder, unlike felony murder, is not analyzed in the abstract.24 
19. Id. at 683, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 24 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(1)) (emphasis 
added by the court). 
20. Id. at 683-84, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (arguing by analogy to Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 
at 831, 678 P.2d at 898, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 323-24). 
21. Id. at 682, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 24 (citing People v. Shockley, 79 Cal. App. 3d 669, 
674-77, 145 Cal. Rptr. 200, 202-03 (1978); People v. Northrop, 132 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 
1031-40, 182 Cal. Rptr. 197, 199-204 (1982) (disapproved on other grounds in People v. 
Smith, 35 Cal. 3d 799, 807-08, 678 P.2d 886, 891-92, 201 Cal. Rptr. 311, 316-17 (1984))). 
22. Id. at 684, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 25. 
23. Id., 255 Cal. Rptr. at 26. 
24. W. LAFAVE & A. SC01"r, supra note 14, § 7.4(a), at 618-19. 
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The evidence in a particular case must show that the defendants 
knew their acts or omissions were endangering life. 211 
Tina Caffero knew something was wrong with her baby. She 
consulted her mother-in-law and hospital emergency room per-
sonnel. "[B]ut the advice she received conveyed no sense of ur-
gency about the need for immediate medical attention. "26 
Hospital personnel's response to her call on New Year's Eve 
and again two days later as she waited in the emergency room 
for nearly an hour and a half to have her baby examined demon-
strated their assumption that Christina's condition was " 'non-
urgent.' "27 The court concluded: 
It is reasonably inferable that Christina's 
death was caused by grossly inadequate care at 
the hands of defendants, specifically their failure 
to maintain minimally acceptable standards of 
hygiene and to seek timely medical care for 
Christina. However, there is no evidence defend-
ants were actually aware their conduct endan-
gered Christina's life .... 
. . . [Therefore,] the evidence will not support 
the inference defendants acted with conscious or 
wanton disregard for human life and thus with 
malice aforethought. 28 
The reported facts do not disclose the age of Christina's 
parents or whether she was their first child. Nor does the case 
reveal where or how they lived, their income, or whether they 
had a family doctor. 
The court of appeal, in refusing to recognize child abuse as 
a predicate to felony murder, appears to have concluded that 
25. "Malice is implied ... 'when defendant does an act with a high probability that 
it will result in death and does it with a base antisocial motive and with a wanton disre-
gard for human life.''' Caffero, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 685, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 26 (quoting 
People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290, 300, 637 P.2d 279, 285, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43, 49 (1981)). 
26. [d. 
27. [d. at 681, 685, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 23, 26. 
28. [d. at 685-86, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 26. 
14
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prison is not the appropriate place for ignorant parents. Al-
though the Cafferos may have been grossly negligent during the 
twelve days Christina was in their care, the court seems to have 
decided that their baby's death was punishment enough. 
Society does not prepare most young people to be good par-
ents. Perhaps the court was suggesting that education in good 
parenting and assistance and support for young parents can be 
provided at a far smaller social and fiscal cost than 
imprisonment. 
Mary Ratcliff* 
B. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
1. Cohabitant need not have a full quasi-marital relation-
ship for protection from domestic violence under Penal 
Code section 273.5. 
People v. Holifield, 205 Cal. App. 3d 993, 252 Cal. Rptr. 729 
(1988). In People v. Holifield, the California court of appeal af-
firmed a trial court decision convicting Holifield for inflicting 
corporal injury upon a cohabitant. The court of appeal rejected 
a rigid interpretation of "cohabitation" and instead opted for a 
more expansive definition in order to broaden the scope of pro-
tection against domestic violence. 
Defendant Maxie Joe Holifield shared a small motel room 
with Mary Andres. l Although Andres maintained the residence 
and paid all the rent, Holifield shared a bed with her and kept 
some clothes and other personal belongings there.2 The couple 
had infrequent sexual relations; however, both agreed that their 
relationship was not intimate in spite of Andres' strong feelings 
for Holifield.3 The couple did not maintain a joint bank account 
• J.D., 1990, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. Holifield, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 995, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 730. 
2. [d. at 995-96, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 730-31. 
3. [d. at 996, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 731. 
15
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or make any major purchases together. Often, Holifield would 
shower and change at Andres' and then go out to meet others 
without her.· 
From June until August 1986, Holifield stayed at Andres' 
sporadically. Each time he left, he took his belongings with him.1I 
During the middle of August, he returned, and on August 29, 
Holifield battered and terrorized Andres in the motel room.6 
The trial jury convicted Holifield of inflicting corporal injury on 
a cohabitant.7 He appealed, claiming that the statutory defini-
tion of cohabitation in section 273.5 of the California Penal 
Code was void for vagueness, that the jury was improperly in-
structed, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
jury's finding. s 
The court began its analysis by affirming the importance of 
certainty in legislation as a means of ensuring due process.9 It 
then delineated two requirements that a statute must meet if 
the statute is not to be voided for vagueness. First, the statute 
must be clear enough to provide reasonable notice of the prohib-
ited conduct. The standard applied is that persons of average 
intelligence should not have to " 'guess' " at the meaning of the 
statute and " 'differ' " as to its application. Second, the statute 
must be definite enough to protect against" 'arbitrary and dis-
criminatory' " enforcement and interpretation by police and the 
judiciary.lo 
The court of appeal then referred to a recent challenge to 
the validity of Penal Code section 273.5. In People v. Ballard, an 
appellate court reasoned that a statute could not be deemed 
vague if the language employed accorded with long usage or 
common law meaning. The Ballard court, relying on Lorenson u. 
Superior Court, determined that the term cohabitation had 
4. Id., 252 Cal. Rptr. at 730-31. 
5. Id., 252 Cal. Rptr. at 730. 
6. Id. at 995, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 730. 
7.Id. 
8. Id. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5(a) (West Supp. 1990) provides in part: "Any person 
who willfully inflicts ... upon any person of the opposite sex with whom he or she is 
cohabiting . . . corporal injury . . . is guilty of a felony . . . ." 
9. Holifield, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 731. 
10. Id. (quoting People v. Superior Court (Caswell), 46 Cal. 3d 381, 389-90, 758 P.2d 
1046, 1049, 250 Cal. Rptr. 515, 518 (1988)). 
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been used for over 100 years in California law and that it had an 
established common law meaning - to live together. ll 
After briefly surveying other legal interpretations of cohabi-
tation, the Holifield court examined the intent behind the stat-
ute. It referred again to Ballard, which had noted that the pur-
pose of section 273.5 was to expand the scope of an earlier wife 
beating statute. I2 Thus, the court reasoned that a more expan-
sive interpretation of section 273.5 could afford protection 
against a broader range of domestic violence, especially with re-
spect to cohabitants. I3 
The court of appeal then articulated its definition of cohabi-
tation. It rejected defendant's rigid interpretation - a relation-
ship in which a man and woman live together and assume mari-
tal roles - adopting instead the Ballard definition of 
cohabitation, a " 'significant relationship' " between a male and 
female living together, but not necessarily in a de facto mar-
riage. I4 However, the court did qualify this definition. It stated 
that since the purpose behind the statute was to protect against 
domestic violence, it was necessary for the relationship to in-
clude some amorous or sexual intimacy. 111 
Buttressing its decision with a second rationale for constru-
ing the statute expansively, the court concluded that in order to 
preserve judicial consistency and predictability, it was necessary 
that the court not be forced into the position of determining 
whether the" 'emotional attachments of the family relationship' 
11. [d. at 997-98, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 731-32 (citing with approval People v. Ballard, 
203 Cal. App. 3d 311, 318, 249 Cal. Rptr. 806, 808-09 (1988) (quoting Lorenson v. Supe-
rior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 49, 60, 216 P. 2d 859, 866 (1950))). 
12. [d. at 998, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 732 (citing Ballard, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 318, 249 Cal 
Rptr. at 808). The Ballard court had compared CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West Supp. 
1990) with CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13700-13731 (West Supp. 1990), also known as the Law 
Enforcement Response to Domestic Violence. Both Penal Code sections were created to 
extend protection against domestic violence to cohabiting couples with significant 
relationships. 
13. Holifield, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 998-99, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 732-33. 
14. [d. at 999, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 732 (citing Ballard, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 318-19, 249 
Cal. Rptr. at 809). 
15. [d., 252 Cal. Rptr. at 733. 
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existed between the parties.' "16 The court of appeal then af-
firmed the validity of section 273.5.17 
In examining the defendant's second objection, the court of 
appeal determined that the jury had been properly instructed. I6 
The court rejected defendant's contention that giving the jurors 
a list of factors they" 'may' " consider granted the jurors license 
to construct their own definition of cohabition. It contended 
that the enumerated factors given to the jury to decide whether 
some "permanency of relationship" existed between Holifield 
and Andres were merely guidelines and that the jury understood 
this.I9 
Finally, the court of appeal dismissed defendant's assertion 
of lack of substantial evidence. Since a de facto marriage was 
not required to qualify as cohabitation, the court concluded that 
the evidence presented was sufficient for the jury reasonably to 
find that the couple had cohabited.20 
Georgine C. Baxter 
16. Id. at 999-1000, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 733 (quoting Eldon [sic) v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 
267, 275-76, 758 P.2d 582, 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. 252, 259 (1988». 
17. Id. at 1000, 252 Cal. Rtpr. at 734. 
18. Id. at 1001, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 734. The jury had been given six elements to con-
sider when determining whether Holifield and Andres had cohabited: 
Id. 
1. Sexual relations between the parties while sharing the same 
living quarters. 
2. Sharing of income and expenses. 
3. Joint use or ownership of property. 
4. Whether the parties hold themselves out as husband and 
wife. 
5. The continuity of the relationship. 
6. The length of the relationship. 
19. Id. at 1001-02, 252 Cal. Rtpr. at 734. 
20. Id., at 1002, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 734-35. 
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III. EMPLOYMENT LAW 
A. GENDER AND ANCESTRY DISCRIMINATION 
1. Hispanic woman offered salary lower than published 
range and lower than salary paid to non-Hispanic man 
who was given the job is found to have filed a "ground-
less action." 
Gonzales v. MetPath, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 3d 422, 262 Cal. 
Rptr. 654 (1989). In Gonzales v. MetPath, Inc., MetPath had 
offered Gonzales, a woman of Mexican-American ancestry, a 
promotion· to the position of operations manager at an annual 
salary of $15,725.1 After her counteroffer of $20,000 was rejected, 
Gonzales declined the offer and MetPath hired a non-Hispanic 
man to fill the same position at an annual salary of $18,870. 
MetPath's published salary range for the position was $17,745 to 
$25,642. Gonzales sued MetPath for discrimination against her 
on the bases of ancestry and gender. 
Affirming the summary judgment granted MetPath by the 
trial court, the California court of appeal defined "discrimina-
tion" to mean "the making of distinctions, i.e., perceiving differ-
ences." In the employment context, an employer is not "forbid-
den to perceive the difference between a good employee and an 
incompetent one, or between a good employee and a better 
one."2 The employment discrimination laws, the court decided, 
"were never intended to turn the private sector workforce into a 
new form of civil service," nor to commission the courts to sit as 
personnel review boards to oversee private business judgments. 
Employers must have "wide latitude to make independent, 
good-faith personnel decisions without the threat of a jury sec-
ond-guessing their business judgments," the court concluded.3 
The majority scolded Gonzales for filing a 
groundless action [which] sends a clear message: 
Employers, beware your minority and female em-
ployees. . . . [They may] engulf you in protracted 
litigation ... even when your business decision is 
1. Gonzales had been serving as acting operations manager, and her performance 
was rated as "excellent." Gonzales, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 424, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 655. 
2. Id. at 426, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 657. 
3. Id. at 428, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 658. 
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to promote a minority woman from the secretarial 
ranks to a managerial position - a decision you 
might never have imagined would provoke her to 
condemn and sue you. Minority and female work-
ers are therefore a potential danger to your busi-
ness; try to avoid hiring them! 
Justice Morio Fukuto concurred in the judgment, but he be-
lieved, unlike the majority, that Gonzales had made a prima fa-
cie case of unlawful discrimination. Nevertheless, he decided 
summary judgment was justified because, he said, MetPath had 
presented a satisfactory reason for offering a higher salary to the 
non-Hispanic male, and Gonzales had not sufficiently under-
mined MetPath's position. Ii 
Ann Chia* 
IV. FAMILY LAW 
A. CHILD SUPPORT 
1. Child support should permit the child's lifestyle to 
comport with the supporting parent's when that par-
ent's wealth greatly exceeds the wealth of the custodial 
parent. 
In re Marriage of Catalano, 204 Cal. App 3d 543, 251 Cal. 
Rptr. 370 (1988). In Marriage of Catalano, the California court 
of appeal reaffirmed its commitment to safeguarding the rights 
of the innocent victims of divorce: children. 
The Catalano court determined that the trial court had 
abused its discretion in modifying a previous child support 
award when it increased the amount to only $1,100 per month. 
4.Id. 
5. Id. at 428-29, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 658-59. 
• J.D., 1990, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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The court of appeal reversed and directed the trial court to in-
crease the order to $2,000 per month, the amount pleaded by the 
wife. In rendering its decision, the court cited the marked esca-
lation of the husband's income as the material change in circum-
stances warranting the increment. 
In 1983, after six years of marriage, Conni and Patrick Cata-
lano were divorced. The court ordered that Conni, who was 
awarded custody of their only child, Jannik, receive $1,750 per 
month in spousal support and $475 per month in child support. 
At the time of dissolution, Conni's income ranged from $25,000 
to $30,000, and Patrick's was approximately $50,000. 1 
In 1985, Conni sought modification of the support orders 
due to her lack of employment. The Catalanos agreed on a 
spousal support increase from $1,750 per month to $2,625. The 
modification order stipulated that Conni waived her right to fur-
ther spousal support after December 1986.2 
In December 1986, Conni filed the instant motion request-
ing a monthly child support increase from $475 to $2,000.3 At 
the time she filed Conni was working only part time, while Pat-
rick's income had increased almost eight-fold.· The trial court 
raised the amount of child support to $1,110 per month and 
awarded Conni attorney fees and costs.~ Both Conni and Patrick 
appealed the decision.6 
The general rule regarding modification of a child support 
order requires the moving party to establish that a material 
1. Catalano, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 547, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 372. 
2.Id. 
3.Id. 
4. Id. at 547-48,251 Cal. Rptr. at 372-73. Patrick Catalano's income increased from 
$50,000 in 1983 to $395,000 in 1984 according to tax returns. 
5. Id. at 548, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 373. 
6. Id. at 546-48, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 372-73. Whereas Conni maintained that the child 
support increase was too low, Patrick maintained that the awards of child support and 
attorney fees were excessive. He also contended that Conni's petition to modify the child 
support agreement was an attempt to restore the spousal support to which she had 
waived her right previously. In addition, Patrick asserted that the child support modifi-
cation was ordered without evidence of a material change in circumstances. 
21
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change of circumstances has occurred.7 "'[AJnything that af-
fects the financial status of either party' " may constitute a ma-
terial change of circumstances.8 
However, as Patrick asserted in his argument, improved fi-
nancial status alone is not sufficient to warrant a modification. 
The supported party must demonstrate (1) the inadequacy of 
the prior award or (2) an increase in his or her need. The need 
must remain unmet.9 
An exception to the general rule exits. The court may imply 
a material change of circumstances to promote the welfare of the 
child unless the prior stipulation was an " 'agreed statement of 
facts on which the portion of the decree relating to custody, 
maintenance and education of the children [was] based 
• • • .' 1110 The court of appeal concurred with the trial court 
that, in the instant case, Jannik's needs were not being met and 
that it was in his best interest to imply a material change of 
circumstances. 11 
The court of appeal reiterated the law's refusal to tolerate 
an agreement between the parents which contracted away the 
rights of the child.12 It asserted that if the supporting parent's 
economic position greatly exceeds that of the custodial parent, 
then the child's lifestyle should reflect that of the more economi-
cally comfortable parent. IS Relying on a line of well-established 
cases, the court also stated that the law will recognize the child's 
7. [d. at 548-49, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 373. 
8. [d. at 549, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 373 (quoting In re Marriage of Hoffmeister (Hoffme-
ister I), 161 Cal. App. 3d 1163, 1173, 208 Cal. Rptr. 345, 351 (1984)). The Catalano court 
cautioned that Hoffmeister involved spousal support, not child support, but found it 
analogous. 
9. [d. Patrick Catalano raised another issue which the court of appeal dismissed. 
Relying on In re Marriage of Hoffmeister (Hoffmeister II), 191 Cal. App. 3d 351, 363, 236 
Cal. Rptr. 543, 550 (1987), he contended that, at the time of the modification, there had 
to be a nexus between the supported spouse's needs and the standard of living enjoyed 
while married, not the standard of living of the supporting spouse at the time of the 
modification hearing. The court of appeal deemed this argument applicable only in 
spousal support modification cases, not in child support modification. Catalano, 204 Cal. 
App. 3d at 549, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 373. 
10. [d. at 549-50, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 374 (quoting Singer v. Singer, 7 Cal. App. 3d 807, 
812-13, 87 Cal. Rptr 42, 45 (1970)). 
11. [d. at 551, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 375. 
12. [d. at 552, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 375. 
13. [d., 251 Cal. Rptr. at 375-76. 
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right to receive more than the bare necessities. I' Whether or not 
the increased support elevates the supported spouse's standard 
of living is not the relevant consideration.11I 
The court of appeal then reviewed the trial court's decision 
regarding the amount of the support modification. In doing so, it 
confronted the issue of whether or not the amount prayed for by 
Conni was "unjustifiably inflated by about $900 . . . . "16 It also 
addressed whether or not the trial court had abused its discre-
tion in "impliedly finding that the husband's concededly high 
standard of living and ability to pay did not overcome any infla-
tion of the claimed expenses."17 
After studying the financial records submitted by Conni, the 
court of appeal determined that her child support needs ex-
ceeded the $2,000 pleaded amount. IS The court then addressed 
Patrick's challenges to the support and concluded that the 
monthly award should only have been reduced by $150.19 
Patrick further asserted that Conni should have been work-
ing fulltime. However, the court found the monitary advantage 
of working fulltime would be offset by the additional expenses of 
childcare and the decrease in time spent with Jannik.20 
14. Id. The court cited Singer, 7 Cal. App. 3d at 813, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 45; In re 
Marriage of Hanchett, 199 Cal. App. 3d 937, 943, 245 Cal. Rptr. 255, 258 (1988); White v. 
Marciano, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 1034, 235 Cal. Rptr. 779, 782 (1987). 
15. Id., 251 Cal. Rptr. at 376 (citing White v. Marciano, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 1034, 
235 Cal. Rptr. 779, 783 (1987)). 
16. Id. at 553, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 376. 
17. Id. The trial court determines the amount of support. This figure cannot be 
altered on appeal without a clear showing of abuse of discretion, i.e., that no judge could 
reasonably have ordered that amount of support, given the circumstances. 
18. [d. at 553-56. 251 Cal. Rptr. at 376-78. 
19. [d. at 553-55, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 376-78. Patrick challenged the allocation of $100 
per month for therapy. He contended that the 1983 decree provided that further coun-
seling was subject to the approval of the court-appointed therapist who determined that, 
at the time of the divorce, therapy was unnecessary. Patrick also questioned investments 
made by Conni since their divorce. The court's calculations concluded with only a $50 
per month reduction. 
20. [d. at 554, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 377. 
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The court of appeal found that the trial court had erred in 
failing to determine that Patrick's extensive wealth counterbal-
anced any inflation in Conni's need. 21 After comparing and con-
trasting the disparity of lifestyles between the parents and as-
serting that the law favors the child in divorce proceedings, the 
court of appeal concluded that only the full $2,000 amount 
would be "tolerable. "22 
The Catalano court demonstrated a sensitivity to the plight 
of many women and children in divorce. It recognized that 
women and children are often the economic victims of a divorce 
and that this economic suffering can continue for years after the 
dissolution of the marriage. 
The court of appeal's decision also serves notice to the sup-
porting parent, alerting him to the fact that if his economic situ-
ation dramatically improves, the court will enforce the child's 
right to a comporting lifestyle. 
Georgine C. Baxter 
2. Child support obligation continues until child com-
pletes twelfth grade or attains the age of nineteen. 
Politzer v. Himmelsbach, 212 Cal. App. 3d 295, 260 Cal. 
Rptr. 450 (1989). In Politzer v. Himmelsbach, Politzer, relying 
on a 1977 court order, refused to continue to pay child support 
when his son reached majority. However, his son was still at-
tending high school when Politzer ceased making the payments. 
California Civil Code section 196(a) provides that "[t]he fa-
ther and mother of a child have an equal responsibility to sup-
port and educate their child .... JJl Section 196.5, enacted in 
1985, states that this duty "shall continue as to any unmarried 
21. [d. at 555, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 378. 
22. [d. at 556, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 378. 
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 196(a) (West Supp. 1990). 
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child who has attained the age of 18, is a full-time high school 
student, and resides with a parent, until such time as he or she 
completes the 12th grade or attains the age of 19, whichever first 
occurs."2 
The court observed that section 196.5 has little utility for 
intact families and as a practical matter, child support for a sec-
tion 196.5 child is at issue only in the context of a separation or 
dissolution proceeding.3 The court stated that section 196.5 is 
self-operative in that so long as the condition exists, the obliga-
tion for child support continues.4 The fact that section 196.5 
technically modified the terms of a prior order in Politzer's case 
did not make it inapplicable, because child support orders can 
be modified or revoked at any time.1\ 
Ann Chia* 
B. COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
1. Where concealment of community asset is claimed, 
court may consider evidence of the actual date of sepa-
ration, irrespective of dates in agreement or petition. 
In re Marriage of Umphrey, 218 Cal. App. 3d 647, 267 Cal. 
Rptr. 218 (1990). In In re Marriage of Umphrey, a property set-
tlement agreement executed by the parties recited the parties' 
separation date as "September, 1979." Husband, did not disclose 
the acquisition of a lease of residential property on September 
17, 1979, in the settlement agreement. The property was later 
subleased, netting an income of $250 per month. Wife moved to 
set aside the agreement, claiming that the separation date was in 
June 1980.1 
2. [d. § 196.5 (West Supp. 1990). 
3. Politzer, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 299, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 452. 
4. [d. 
5. [d. at 299·300, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 452. . 
• J.D., 1990, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. Umphrey, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 654, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 220. 
25
Ratcliff et al.: California Law Survey
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1990
720 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:719 
The California court of appeal held that in a motion in eq-
uity to set aside an uncontested judgment of dissolution, "the 
party seeking to uphold the marital agreement may offer evi-
dence proving a date of separation different from that recited in 
the settlement agreement in order to rebut an accusation of con-
cealment of a community property asset."2 There is no jurisdic-
tional or equitable bar to the court's consideration of evidence 
bearing on the actual date of separation, irrespective of the reci-
tations in the agreement or the petition.3 
Ann Chia* 
2. Court may order reimbursement to community for pay-
ment after separation of child support arrearage in-
curred before this marriage. 
In re Marriage of Williams, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1239, 262 Cal. 
Rptr. 317 (1989). In In re Marriage of Williams, the California 
court of appeal concluded that the legislature enacted California 
Civil Code section 4800(e)1 with intent to create a limited excep-
tion to the general rule against reimbursement to the commu-
nity for debts paid during marriage.2 This exception is based on 
the post-separation status of the parties, and section 4800(e) ex-
pressly covers debts paid after separation but before trial with-
out reference to the subject matter of the debt.3 
The court held that premarital child support debts are 
within the purview of section 4800(e) and ordered reimburse-
ment to the community for money expended after separation 
2. [d. at 652, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 219. 
3. [d. at 659, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 223. 
• J.D., 1990, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. "[T)he court has jurisdiction to order reimbursement in cases it deems appropri-
ate for debts paid after separation but prior to trial." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(e) (West 
Supp. 1990). 
2. Williams, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1245, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 321. 
3. [d. at 1246, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 322. 
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and before trial to satisfy the husband's child support arrearage 
incurred prior to the marriage.· 
Ann Chia* 
C. CUSTODY 
1. Natural father,'s biological relationship alone does not 
entitle him to custody when mother relinquishes child 
for adoption. 
Adoption of Kelsey S., 218 Cal. App. 3d 130, 266 Cal. Rptr. 
760 (1990). In Adoption of Kelsey S., the California court of ap-
peal concluded that "a natural father's biological relationship to 
his child, standing alone, does not entitle him to. an absolute 
right to that child's custody absent a showing of detriment."} 
The doctrine of constructive receipt2 cannot be used to establish 
a natural father as a presumed father whose consent may then 
be required if the child's natural mother decides to relinquish 
the child for adoption.3 
A best interests determination is "a constitutionally appro-
priate substantive standard in a California Civil Code section 
7017(d)(2) custody dispute between a natural father and a 
4. [d. 
• J.D., 1990, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. Kelsey S., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 139, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 766. 
2. One of the conditions set forth in California Civil Code section 7004 by which a 
father qualifies as a presumed father is that "he receives the child into his home and 
openly holds out the child as his natural child." CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(4) (West Supp. 
1990). 
3. See id. § 224 (West 1982). 
27
Ratcliff et al.: California Law Survey
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1990
722 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:721 
child's prospective adoptive parents."· California Civil Code sec-
tion 7017(d)(2) asks a court to determine, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, whether terminating the parental rights of a natu-
ral father who has not had a custodial relationship to his child is 
in the best interests of that child. Ii 
Ann Chia* 
2. Speculation over whether the mother will enter a rela-
tionship cannot be the basis for removal of custody. 
In re Steve W., 217 Cal. App. 3d 10, 265 Cal. Rptr. 650 
(1990). In In re Steve W., the California court of appeal stated 
that speculation over whether a mother would enter a relation-
ship which might threaten her child's well-being cannot be the 
basis for removing the physical custody of the child from the 
parent.1 The decision to remove must be based on substantial 
evidence, and evidence that no less drastic alternatives could be 
successfully implemented to sufficiently protect the child's well-
being should also be presented.2 
Ann Chia* 
4. Kelsey S., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 139, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 766. 
5. [d. at 140, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 766. 
• J.D., 1990, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. Steve w., 217 Cal. App. 3d at 22, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 657. 
2. [d. at 23, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 658. 
• J.D., 1990, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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D. PATERNITY 
1. California's statutory presumption of husband's pater-
nity is unconstitutional where husband and wife do not 
wish to raise wife's child together. 
In re Melissa G., 213 Cal. App. 3d 1082, 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 
(1989). In In re Melissa G., the California court of appeal re-
versed the juvenile court's order of paternity of Fermin, the ex-
husband of Melissa's mother, as to Melissa, who was born eight 
days before the separation of her mother and Fermin. The court 
held that the application of California Evidence Code section 
621 1 is unconstitutional in an instance in which the statute's 
classification does not serve the interests it was designed to 
protect.2 
Melissa's natural father, Felix,3 who had lived with Melissa 
for the four years since her birth, has a significant interest in a 
paternal relationship with Melissa, the court found. It also con-
sidered the fact that her presumed father, Fermin, is a stranger 
to her and that her most important psychological relationship is 
to a younger sister who is also Felix's natural child but to whom, 
under the statute, Melissa is presumed biologically unrelated.' 
The court distinguished the recent opinion of the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Michael H. u. Gerald D.," which upheld Califor-
nia's conclusive paternity presumption against constitutional at-
tack.s The court of appeal observed that Justice Scalia, writing 
1. California Evidence Code section 621(a) provides that "the issue of a wife cohab-
iting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a 
child of the marriage." However, husband may raise a notice of motion for blood tests 
not later than two years from the child's date of birth under subdivision (c). CAL. EVID. 
CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1990). 
2. Melissa G., 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1089, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 898. 
3. Melissa's mother married Felix after she and Fermin separated. Results of a 
blood test established a 99.1 % probability that Felix was Melissa's father. Id. at 1084, 
261 Cal. Rptr. at 895. 
4. Melissa G., 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1089, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 898. 
5. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989). 
6. In his dissent to the five to four decision, Justice Brennan described a further 
opinion shared by a majority of the Court: " 'Five Members of the Court refuse to fore-
close "the possibility that a natural father might ever have a constitutionally protected 
interest in his relationship with a child whose mother was married to and cohabiting 
·with another man at the time of the child's conception and birth."'" Melissa G., 213 
Cal. App. 3d at 1088, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 897 (quoting Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2349 
(Brennan, J., dissenting, quoting Stevens, J., concurring». 
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for the plurality, had "explicitly left open the possibility" that 
the natural father may have a constitutionally protected interest 
in a relationship with his child where the husband and wife do 
not wish to raise the child jointly.' 
Justice Scalia had found in the California statute the ex-
pression of a " 'categorical preference' " for preserving the mari-
tal union extant at a child's birth.8 In Melissa's case, however, 
the court of appeal concluded that preference did not apply, as 
the union between her mother and then-husband Fermin had 
long since been dissolved.9 
Ann Chia* 
E. PUTATIVE MARRIAGE 
1. A putative spouse is a "surviving spouse" under the 
Probate Code and as such is entitled to the one-half 
interest of an omitted spouse. 
Estate of Sax, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1300, 263 Cal. Rptr. 190 
(1989). In Estate of Sax, the California court of appeal held that 
a surviving putative spouse is a "surviving spouse" within Cali-
fornia Probate Code section 6560.1 This section provides that "if 
a testator fails to provide by will for his or her surviving spouse 
who married the testator after the execution of the will, the 
omitted spouse shall receive ... (a) the one-half of the commu-
nity property that belongs to the testator ... [and] (b) the one-
half of the quasi-community property that belongs to the testa-
tor .... "2 
7.Id. 
8. Id. at 1089, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 898. 
9. Id. at 1088-89, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 897-98. 
• J.D., 1990, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. Sax, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 1306, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 193. 
2. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6560 (West Supp. 1990). 
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In this case of first impression, the dispute was between 
Sax's first and second wives. Because he had married his second 
wife the same day his judgment of divorce from his first wife was 
filed, but one day before it was entered in the judgment book, 
his second wife was technically only a putative spouse. The first 
wife presented a will that predated the invalid second marriage 
and named her as sole beneficiary.3 
Nevertheless, the court ruled that Sax's interest in the 
property acquired during that second marriage belonged to the 
putative spouse. The phrase "spouse who married the testator" 
in section 6560 did not preclude her from the definition of 
"omitted spouse."· 
Arm Chia* 
2. A woman's belief that her marriage conforms to the 
precepts of her faith is insufficient to confer on her the 
status of putative spouse. 
In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 248 Cal. 
Rptr. 807 (1988). The Vryonis court denied putative spouse sta-
tus to an Iranian woman whose marriage conformed to the 
precepts of her religious faith. The court ruled that an honestly 
held belief in the validity of one's marriage is not enough to es-
tablish putative marriage. The belief must have been in good 
faith and therefore objectively reasonable. Further, the belief 
must have been that the marriage conformed to California law. 
Fereshteh and Speros Vryonis worked together at UCLA's 
Center for Near Eastern Studies, where Fereshteh was a visiting 
professor and Speros the director and a teacher. Fereshteh, an 
Iranian citizen, belonged to the Shiah Moslem Twelve Imams 
religious sect and was involved in the local Islamic community. 
3. [d. at 1302, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 191. 
4. [d. at 1303, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 192. 
* J.D., 1990, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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Speros was a member of the Greek Orthodox Church but did not 
practice his religion. l 
Although they had seen each other occasionally at the 
Center since 1979, they did not begin dating until February and 
March of 1982. Dating without marriage or a commitment, how-
ever, was contrary to Fereshteh's religious beliefs. Consequently 
she married Speros on March 17, 1982, in a Moslem ceremony 
known as a Muta marriage, a ceremony she believed created a 
valid and binding marriage. Speros assured her it did.2 
Many of the indicia usually present in an American mar-
riage were missing from the Vryonis marriage. At Speros' insis-
tence, they maintained separate residences. Only for three 
months did Fereshteh have a key to Speros' house. They merged 
neither their incomes nor property. Claiming single status, they 
filed separate tax returns. 3 
Speros required Fereshteh to keep their marriage a secret. 
In 1982 they spent only twenty-two nights together, fewer in 
1983, and none in 1984. Speros dated other women. In July of 
1984, he told Fereshteh he planned to marry someone else; and 
in September he did so" 
As soon as she learned of Speros' plans, Fereshteh ended 
the secrecy and began to tell people that she and Speros were 
married. On October 15, 1984, she petitioned for dissolution. II 
Speros' motion to quash on the basis that a marriage did 
not exist was denied. Superior Court Judge Barbara Jean 
Johnson found that Fereshteh, having no knowledge of Califor-
nia marriage laws, had justifiably relied on Speros' assertions 
that they were husband and wife.6 
Finding, however, that Speros "did not intend" to consent 
to the marriage or to its validity, and because the marriage was 
1. Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 715, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 808-09. 
2. Id., 248 Cal. Rptr. at 809. 
3. Id. at 715-16, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 809. 
4.Id. 
5. Id., 248 Cal. Rptr. 809-10. 
6. Id. at 716, 248 Cal. Rptr. 810. 
32
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol20/iss3/9
1990] SURVEY: WOMEN AND CALIFORNIA LAW 727 
not recorded, the trial court granted Fereshteh the status of a 
putative spouse.7 On Speros' appeal, which was treated as a pe-
remptory writ of mandate,8 the court of appeal directed the trial 
court to vacate its judgment.9 
Presiding Justice Joan Dempsey Klein wrote the appeal 
court's painstaking anaysis. She looked first to the definition of 
marriage in California Civil Code section 4100 as "'a personal 
relation arising out of a civil contract' " to which consent is nec-
essary but not sufficient; a marriage must also be licensed.lo 
"Where the marriage is invalid due to some legal infirmity, 
an innocent party nevertheless may be entitled to relief under 
the long recognized protections of the putative marriage doc-
trine," the court observed.ll As codified at Civil Code section 
4452, the rights of a putative spouse can be conferred only where 
the marriage was statutorily void or voidable. 12 
The Vryonis court, however, relied on In re Marriage of 
Monti,13 which extended the protection of the putative marriage 
doctrine to innocent parties who believe they were validly mar-
ried. The marriage need not be technically void or voidable, but 
merely legally infirm.H The "purported marriage" of Fereshteh 
and Speros, the court found, was "plainly defective" and thus 
was not disqualified as putative on that ground. Iii 
An analysis of the belief an innocent party must have to 
earn the status of putative spouse is the essence of the Vryonis 
court's analysis. Fereshteh's belief must have been honest, in 
good faith and, above all, objectively reasonable.16 To have been 
reasonable, the belief must have been that the marriage con-
formed to California law.17 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 714, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 809. 
9. Id. at 724, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 815. 
10. Id. at 717, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 810 (quoting CAL. CIY. CODE § 4100 (West 1983)). 
11. Id., 248 Cal. Rptr. at 811. 
12. CAL. CIY. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1989). 
13. 135 Cal. App. 3d 50, 185 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1982). 
14. Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 719, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 812. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 720-22, 248 Cal. Rptr. 812-14. 
17. Id. at 722-23, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15. 
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Fereshteh's belief, the court concluded, was not objectively 
reasonable. She was ignorant of California law and made no dili-
gent attempt to comply with it, she did not act like an American 
married woman, and she should not have relied on Speros' as-
surances that they were properly married. IS For the Vryonis 
court, her belief that her marriage was valid according to the law 
of her religion was not enough to make her a putative spouse. I9 
In interpreting California's putative marriage law in light of 
Moslem marriage law, the court in this case giveth and then 
taketh away. In effect it adds some wording to Civil Code § 4452 
and subtracts other wording. 
First the court ignores the wording that an innocent party 
may have putative spouse status only if her marriage was techni-
cally void or voidable.20 Then it reads into the statute wording 
utterly absent, that in Fereshteh's case at least, a putative 
spouse must have obtained a marriage license.21 
The court's conclusion that from the indicia of her marriage 
Fereshteh had no reason to believe it was valid deserves another 
look. Setting aside the likelihood that the indicia of Iranian mar-
riages may be different from those of the usual American mar-
riage, even a California marriage may have many of the attrib-
utes listed by the court. 
A wife in California mayor may not live with her husband, 
take his name, or support or be supported by him. A husband 
may, without being considered very unusual, date other women 
and, while assuring his wife their marriage is valid, insist she 
keep it a secret. Such indicia may suggest an unhappy marriage, 
but not necessarily an illusory one. 
The putative marriage doctrine, as codified in California, 
simply demands a good faith belief in a valid marriage. The 
Vryonis court interpreted the doctrine to mean one must believe 
18. Id. at 721-22, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 813-14. 
19. Id. at 723, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 815. 
20. Id. at 718-19, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 811-12. 
21. The statute, in pertinent part, reads: "Whenever a determination is made that a 
marriage is void or voidable and the court finds that either party or both parties believed 
in good faith that the marriage was valid, the court shall declare the party or parties to 
have the status of a putative spouse .... " CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1989). 
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that one has entered a marriage which is valid under California 
law. A good faith belief that one's marriage is valid under Mos-
lem law is not enough.22 
Fereshteh came from a country where the line between 
church and state is drawn differently from the American way. 
The trial court, implicitly recognizing that marriage law and cus-
tom are unlikely to be the same in Iran and California, gave her 
the protection of putative spouse status. 
The court of appeal ruled, however, that because she "made 
no colorable attempt at compliance [with California law], Fer-
eshteh could not believe reasonably a valid California marriage 
came into being. Fereshteh's ignorance of the law does not com-
pel a contrary conclusion."23 
Mary Ratcliff* 
F. SPOUSAL SUPPORT 
1. Spousal support may not be terminated without evz-
dence of spouse's ability to support herself. 
In re Marriage of Gavron, 203 Cal. App. 3d 705, 250 Cal. 
Rptr. 148 (1988). Marriage of Gavron imposed on the trial 
courts the responsibility of encouraging spouses in divorce pro-
ceedings to achieve self sufficiency. However, the court of appeal 
reversed a modification of a spousal support order and held that 
since no material change in the wife's ability to support herself 
22. Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 723, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 815. Not mentioned by the 
Vryonis court is California Civil Code § 4215. That statute validates marriages not sol-
emnized by members of the clergy or judiciary if the marriage conforms to a religious 
denomination's "peculiar mode of entering the marriage relation." Such a marriage, how-
ever, must be "declared" by a filing with the county recorder. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4215 
(West 1983). 
23. Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 721, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 813. 
• J.D., 1990, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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had been shown, the trial court's termination of spousal support 
payments constituted an abuse of its discretion. l 
Bernard and Mildred Gavron were married approximately 
twenty-five years before separating and ultimately dissolving 
their marriage.2 Early in their marriage, Mildred had worked for 
a few years to enhance the earning potential of her husband. 
Primarily, though, she had devoted her life to her family.3 After 
the divorce, Mildred worked sporadically at low-paying jobs but 
quit each because of health problems." 
Although Mildred had assets - her house, some invest-
ments, and $40,000 in the bank - her primary source of income 
was her spousal support.1I Mildred lived with and supported her 
mother who nominally contributed to food purchases.6 
At dissolution, the trial court ordered Bernard to make 
monthly spousal support payments of $1,100 until further court 
notice.7 Two years later, in 1981, the trial court denied Bernard's 
request for reduction and eventual cessation of spousal support.s 
In 1986, Bernard again requested modification of the 
spousal support order, petitioning for termination of support.9 
Bernard contended that his expenses exceeded his income in 
spite of a finding that his income had increased and his expenses 
had decreased. lo In March of 1987, the trial court ordered the 
cessation of support as of August 1987, reasoning that Mildred's 
failure to become gainfully employed or to make herself employ-
able shifted the burden to her to evince need for financial 
support. 11 
1. Gavron, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 707, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 150. 
2.Id. 
3. Id. at 708, 712, 250 Cal. Rptr at 150, 153. 
4. Id. at 708-09, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51. Mildred Gavron suffered form tumors on 
her feet, shoulder problems, and arthritis. These medical difficulties impaired her mobil-
ity, and thus limited her work capability. 
5. Id. at 709, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 151. 
6. Id., 250 Cal. Rptr. at 150. Mildred's age was 57. Her mother was 87. Id. at 707-
08, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 150 . 
. 7. Id. at 707, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 150. 
8. Id. at 707-08, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 150. 
9. Id. at 708, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 150. 
10. Id. at 709, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 151. 
11. Id. at 708, 710, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 150, 151. 
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A change of circumstances "includes all factors affecting 
need and ability to pay."l2 The court of appeal discussed the 
trial court's discretionary limits in defining a change of circum-
stances, relying on In re Marriage of Norvall for the premise 
that modification of a spousal support order requires that" 'the 
moving party must show a material change of circumstances 
since the time of the prior order.' "13 Citing Edwards v. Ed-
wards/4 the court determined that "change of circumstances" 
required more than a mere passage of time. 1I1 
The court deemed the two cases cited by Mr. Gavron inap-
posite and decided that the burden of demonstrating continued 
need should not have shifted to the wife. 16 It distinguished In re 
Marriage of Sheridan17 because there the trial court had ex-
pressly told the wife that she was expected to achieve self suffi-
ciency. Her failure to comply with the court's expectation had 
constituted a change of circumstances.18 
The court dismissed In re Marriage of Pekar19 as inapplica-
ble. The wife in Pekar, unlike Mildred Gavron, had been em-
ployed at the time of the original support order. Consequently, 
unless she could sustain the burden of demonstrating her need 
for continued support, termination of the support after five ' 
years was deemed just.20. 
California Civil Code section 4801(a) empowers the court to 
award whatever spousal support the court deems "just and rea-
sonable."21 In utilizing the broad discretion afforded by the stat-
ute, the court of appeal's decision evinced its sensitivity to the 
12. Id. at 710, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 151 (citing In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d 
437, 454, 573 P. 2d 41, 53, 143 Cal. Rptr. 139, 151 (1978)). 
13. Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Norvall, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1047, 1060, 237 Cal. 
Rptr 770, 778 (1987)). 
14. 52 Cal. App. 3d 12, 124 Cal. Rptr. 742 (1975). 
15. Gavron, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 710, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 151 (citing Edwards, 52 Cal. 
App. 3d at 15, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 744). 
16. Id. at 710-11, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 152. 
17. 140 Cal. App. 3d 742, 189 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1983). 
18. Gavron, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 710, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 152 (citing Sheridan, 140 Cal. 
App. 3d at 748, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 625.) 
19. 173 Cal. App. 3d 367, 218 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1985). 
20. Gavron, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 710, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 152 (citing Pekar, 173 Cal. 
App. 3d at 371-72, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 826-27.) 
21. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a) (West Supp. 1990). 
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plight of women caught in the trauma of divorce. It recognized 
that many women in lengthy marriages never develop marketa-
ble skills; they devote themselves instead to the duties of wife 
and mother. The court realized that a carefully embroidered 
remedy must be fashioned when dealing with such delicate situ-
ations. In essence, the court asserted that it must function as a 
monitor in order to protect the interests of both parties and so-
ciety as a whole. 
Yet, the protection afforded the supported party is not 
blind, as the court frowned on the cultivation of continued de-
pendency. The court recognized the importance of assisting sup-
ported spouses in becoming self sufficient. In order to facilitate 
this, the court of appeal charged trial courts with the role of de-
limiting the term of support and with pronouncing its expecta-
tion that the supported party strive to achieve self sufficiency. 
The court outlined methods for creating awareness of its ex-
pectations. For example, the court may explicitly state its expec-
tations at the time of the original order;22 it may require that the 
supported party be examined by a vocational training consult-
ant; or the parties may reach an agreement as to the supported 
spouse's ability to obtain future employment or continue current 
employment.23 In any case, the court cautioned against taxing 
the supported spouse with unrealistic projections for achieving 
self sufficiency. 24 
Georgine C. Baxter 
22. Gavron, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 712, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 153. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. at 712-13, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 153. 
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V. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
A. DISCIPLINE 
1. Lawyer is disbarred for taking bar examination for 
husband. 
In re Lamb, 49 Cal. 3d 239, 260 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1989). In In 
re Lamb, Laura Beth Lamb was disbarred for taking the Califor-
nia bar examination for her husband. l The California Supreme 
Court, in adopting the state bar court's recommendation, held: 
"'Only ... the most compelling mitigating circumstances'" 
could prevent disbarment because of the public danger inherent 
in bar exam cheating and the criminal dishonesty and moral tur-
pitude involved.2 
The fact that Lamb was seven months pregnant and suffer-
ing from chronic diabetes as well as the emotional stress from a 
rapidly deteriorating marriageS was not compelling enough, ac-
cording to the court. Bad faith, dishonesty or concealment, and 
significant harm to the public or to the administration of justice 
constituted aggravating circumstances.' 
The supreme court accepted the state bar's suggestion that 
if an attorney's criminal breach of professional standards is mor-
ally serious and dangerous, only the most overwhelming evi-
dence of mitigation could prevent disbarment in the public in-
terest.1I If extreme emotional difficulties or physical disabilities 
at the time of the misconduct serve as mitigating circumstances, 
then the member subject to discipline must first establish by 
1. Despite her pregnancy, illness, and stress, Lamb placed ninth out of the 7,688 
taking the bar in July 1985. Lamb, 49 Cal. 3d at 243 n.2,. 260 Cal. Rptr. at 857 n.2; 
Carlsen, Lawyer Disbarred for Taking Bar Exam for Her Husband, San Francisco 
Chron., Aug. 8, 1989, at 1, col. 3. 
2. Lamb, 49 Cal. 3d at 242, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 856 (citing STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEY 
SANCTIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT § 3.2 (Cal. State Bar 1986)). 
3. In his dissent, Justice Marcus Kaufman recounted the stresses Lamb was suffer-
ing. The complications of her pregnancy included acetone levels, high blood pressure and 
protein deficiency that threatened the lives of herself and her baby. Her physician had 
recommended abortion, which she refused. In addition, her husband had become violent, 
pushing and shaking her, smashing furniture, and threatening to kill her and the baby if 
she did not take the examination for him. Lamb was hospitalized in intensive care imme-
diately after the exam and delivered her daughter 10 days later. [d. at 250-53; 260 Cal. 
Rptr. at 862-64 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). 
4. [d. at 245, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 859. 
5. [d. at 246, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 859. 
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clear and convincing evidence that he or she has completely re-
covered and been rehabilitated.6 
Ann Chia* 
IV. TORT LAW 
A. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
1. Wife states no cause of action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress or loss of consortium arising out of 
the allegedly wrongful termination of husband's 
employment. 
Anderson v. Northrop Corp., 203 Cal. App. 3d 772, 250 Cal. 
Rptr. 189 (1988). In Anderson v. Northrop Corp. the court of 
appeal narrowed the field of foreseeable plaintiffs permitted to 
proceed to trial on the tort of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. While acknowledging the distress a wife may suffer 
when her husband is unlawfully discharged, the court denied 
Pauline Anderson the opportunity to prove her husband's em-
ployer liable to her for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
In addition, the court upheld dismissal of the wife's claim to 
compensation for loss of consortium on the ground she failed to 
plead a sufficiently substantial and long lasting disruption of her 
marital relationship. 
6. Id. Justice Kaufman, however, concluded that Lamb had "not only clearly and 
convincingly, but beyond question" done everything possible to eliminate the stresses 
that led to her misconduct - she had ended her marriage, controlled her diabetes, and 
voluntarily committed to long-term therapy - and should be disciplined with probation 
and suspension rather than disbarment. 
He reported cases in which the supreme court had suspended but not disbarred 
other attorneys whose mitigating circumstances were less compelling and whose miscon-
duct was as egregious. One attorney had solicited someone to kill a former client who 
had initimidated and harrassed him; others dealt and smuggled drugs; and still others 
suborned perjury, submitted false evidence, abandoned clients, obtained loans through 
misrepresentation, and lied during disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 253-56, 260 Cal. Rptr. 
at 864-66 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). . 
* J.D., 1990, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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Pauline and Roger Anderson moved to Saudi Arabia in 
1977, when Roger Anderson was assigned by Northrop Corpora-
tion to work there as a technical language instructor and super-
visor. 1 "Pauline changed not only her residence but her entire 
way of life," the court observed.2 
Northrop had provided information to both the Andersons 
to prepare them for the" 'culture shock' " of their resettlement.s 
Recognizing the traumatic nature of such a move, the court de-
scribed Saudi Arabia as "a foreign country in every sense of the 
word.'" 
Despite the difficulties, Pauline Anderson adjusted success-
fully to life in her new home. The distress that gave rise to this 
complaint was prompted not by the resettlement, but by the 
sudden end to her new way of life. 
During seven and one-half years the Andersons had grown 
accustomed to Saudi Arabian culture. But "'when [Northrop] 
suddenly, without just cause, terminated [Roger], [their] secur-
ity, future, and lifestyle collapsed. [They] were now unemployed 
in a foreign mid-east country, without any prospects of future 
employment.' "5 
Pauline Anderson alleged that Northrop should reasonably 
have foreseen her anxiety and was legally liable for her distress. 
She also claimed that Northrop was responsible for her loss of 
consortium resulting from her husband's distress.6 
The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress was 
first described two decades ago by the California Supreme Court 
in Dillon u. Legg.7 In Anderson, the court of appeal applied the 
two major analyses that have evolved since Dillon and deter-
mined that the claim failed both tests. 
1. Anderson, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 774, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 190-91. 
2. [d. at 776, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 192. 
3. [d. at 774, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 191. 
4. [d. at 776, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 192. 
5. [d. at 775, 250 Cal. Rptr. at lin (brackets in opinion). 
6. [d. at 774-75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 191. 
. 7. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), construed in Ochoa v. Supe-
rior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 166, 703 P.2d 1, 5, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661, 665 (1985). 
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First the court applied the Dillon "bystander" analysis. In 
Dillon, a little girl had been killed by a car as she crossed the 
street. Her mother and sister had been watching nearby.s 
Under the old zone-of-danger rule, the court could have jus-
tified recovery to the sister but not to the mother "merely be-
cause of a happenstance that the sister was some few yards 
closer to the accident."9 
The Dillon court rejected the assertion that, because the 
mother was a bystander outside the zone of danger, defendant 
bore her no duty of care. The concept of duty, the court ex-
plained, "is not an old and deep-rooted doctrine but a legal de-
vice of the latter half of the nineteenth century designed to cur-
tail the feared propensities of juries toward liberal awards. "10 
Refusing to "deny recovery upon a legitimate claim because 
other fraudulent ones may be urged,"ll the Dillon court reached 
back to "the general rules of tort law"12 and identified foresee-
ability as the touchstone of its analysis. 13 The court held that 
the issue of foreseeability should be determined on a case-by-
case basis1' by evaluating the degree of physical, temporal, and 
family relational proximity of the victim to the plaintiff 
bystander. 111 
Even assuming Pauline Anderson's distress at her husband's 
discharge was foreseeable, the Anderson court found that she 
had failed to establish a sufficient nexus with Northrop's liabil-
ity.lO The court acknowledged that, following Dillon, foreseeabil-
ity is "the critical determinant of duty."17 However, the court 
found support for denying Anderson's claim in the decision of 
8. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74. 
9. [d. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75. 
10. [d. at 734, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76. 
11. [d. at 735, 441 P.2d at 917,69 Cal. Rptr. at 77 (emphasis deleted). 
12. [d. at 746, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84. 
13. "The touchstone of our analysis in Dillon was foreseeability." Ochoa v. Superior 
Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 166, 703 P.2d 1, 5, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661, 665 (1985). 
14. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. 
15. [d. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81. 
16. Anderson, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 777, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 192-93. 
17. [d. at 776, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 192 (citing Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 739-40, 441 P.2d at 
919-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80). 
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another California court of appeal, Andalon v. Superior Court,I8 
which determined that" 'foreseeability, without more, provides . 
. . an unworkable delineation of the extent of a tortfeasor's lia-
bility.' "19 The essential link missing from Pauline Anderson's 
complaint, the court concluded, was a showing that Northrop 
owed her a duty.20 
Next the court applied the "direct victim" analysis of 
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals21 to the Anderson case. 
In 1980 Molien extended the protection of the tort of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress to a new class of plaintiffs. There 
the California Supreme Court permitted a husband to recover as 
a direct victim of the misdiagnosis of venereal disease in his 
wife, even though he was not in close enough physical or tempo-
ral proximity to the misdiagnosis to recover under the Dillon 
"bystander" analysis.22 
The Anderson court rejected Pauline Anderson's claim that 
she had been a direct victim of Northrop's tortious conduct.23 
Despite the foreseeability that she would be harmed, the court 
concluded that the harm was not "directed" toward her24 be-
cause she "was neither in privity of [the employment contract 
between Northrop and her husband] nor its intended beneficiary 
"25 
Cases from other California courts of appeal cited by the 
Anderson court suggest its analysis may be unnecessarily rigid. 
The third district, for example, in Newton v. Kaiser Foundation 
Hospitals,28 found that a "duty of care may arise from contract 
even though there would otherwise be none. "27 
18. 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1984). 
19. Anderson, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 776, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 192 (quoting Andalon, 162 
Cal. App. 3d at 610, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 905). 
20. [d. at 778, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 193. 
21. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). 
22. [d. at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834. 
23. Anderson, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 780, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 194. 
24. [d. at 777, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 193. 
25. [d. at 778, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 193. 
26. 184 Cal. App. 3d 386, 228 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1986). 
27. [d. at 392, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 894 (citing Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal. 2d 807, 810, 249 
P.2d 257, 260 (1952) (in bank)). 
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The Newton court relied on its previous decision in 
Andalon.28 That decision was based in turn on the California 
Supreme Court's ruling in Biakanja v. Irving29 that the duty of 
care for tortious breach of a contract extended to third party 
beneficiaries. so 
In both Newton and Andalon, the primary parties to the 
contracts were a mother and her medical caregiver. The father 
in each case, because of the marital relationship, was the third 
party beneficiary. SI 
Under this contractual direct victim theory, the contract de-
fines both the duty and the parties to whom the duty is 
foreseeably owed. Marital partners of the primary parties to the 
contract are viewed as third party beneficiaries and are them-
selves entitled to recover as direct victims.s2 
The Anderson court might have used this analysis to permit 
Pauline Anderson to proceed to trial. Like the fathers in Newton 
and Andalon, Anderson based her claim on the tortious breach 
of a contract to which her marital partner was a primary party 
and she was a beneficiary. 
The fact that the contract in this case was for employment 
rather than medical care suggests another theory that might 
have been raised. Because California is a community property 
state, half the earnings of each spouse belongs to the other.ss If 
Roger Anderson's employment contract could have been consid-
ered a .marital asset belonging also to his wife, she should have 
had standing to sue for tortious breach of that contract. 
The court raised, then dismissed, a provocative recovery 
theory. Northrop might have been liable to Pauline Anderson 
when it provided assistance to her at the time of the Andersons' 
28. [d. at 391·92, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 893. 
29. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). 
30. Newton, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 391, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 893. A third party beneficiary 
is a person for whose benefit a contractual promise is made, but who is not a party to the 
contract. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1327 (5th ed. 1979). 
31. Newton, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 391·92, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 893·94. 
32. [d. 
33. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 254 (5th ed. 1979). 
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original transfer to Saudi Arabia.34 The provision of relocation 
assistance "to the nonemployee spouse who may necessarily be 
included in that process" might have established a duty of 
care.31i Because the facts alleged no breach at the time of trans-
fer, however, the court found no need to address the question.36 
Nor was the court concerned with whether a duty of care 
continued. The opinion is silent, for example, as to whether Nor-
thrup deliberately selected married over single employees for 
transfer to Saudi Arabia.37 The company might have speculated 
that the companionship of a spouse during a long foreign assign-
ment would contribute to the employee's stability and 
productivity. 
In rejecting Pauline Anderson's cause of action for loss of 
consortium, the court compared the descriptive words in her 
pleadings with those in Rodriguez u. Bethlehem Steel Corp.38 
Anderson complained that she had" 'suffered a loss of society, 
companionship and support'" from her husband,39 who had 
"'become mentally upset, distressed and aggravated . . . .' "40 
Th~ wife in Rodriguez complained that her husband could" 'no 
longer be a companion and [was] no longer capable of giving 
love, affection, society, comfort and sexual relations to [her] 
, " 41 
To recover, according to the Anderson court, Pauline 
Anderson would have had to prove that her husband's distress 
had been disabling.42 Roger Anderson had suffered neither a 
physical injury nor had he claimed negligent or intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress in his own complaint against 
Northrop.'s Therefore, the court reasoned, the Andersons had 
34. Anderson, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 777 n.1, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 193 n.1. 
35.Id. 
36.Id. 
37. But cf. id. at 774, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 191 (Northrop "did not require, request, 
encourage, or otherwise directly involve [Pauline) in her husband's transfer.") 
38. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974). 
39. Anderson, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 780, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 194. 
40. Id., 250 Cal. Rptr. at 195. 
41. Id. at 781, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 195. 
42.Id. 
43. Id. at 780, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 195. 
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failed to raise the inference of a substantial and long lasting im~ 
pairment in their conjugal relationship." 
The Anderson court recited the rule that a complaint will 
withstand a demurrer if relief can be justified on any grounds.411 
Ironically, the wording of Pauline Anderson's complaint differed 
little from the wording in Rodriguez, which the Anderson court 
used as a model. Nevertheless, the court denied Anderson the 
opportunity to amend her complaint to comply with its 
opinion.'s 
Anderson is remarkable in that the plaintiff's distress arose 
from the loss of a marital partner's long~term employment. Most 
other California cases of negligent infliction of emotional distress 
involve a loved one's injury, disease, or death:n 
Accustomed. to cases of physical loss, the Anderson court 
apparently failed to appreciate the emotional impact the wrong~ 
fulloss of a married couple's livelihood can cause. The court ig~ 
nored as well the special vulnerability of a woman stranded in a 
foreign land where few employment opportunities may have 
been available to women. 
In accepting employment in Saudi Arabia, the Andersons 
gave up the economic independence they probably had previ~ 
ously enjoyed. Pauline Anderson became dependent on her hus~ 
band for support, and he in turn depended on Northrop for 
employment. 
The Andersons' dearth of options made more compelling 
their search for legal redress. Regrettably, the court of appeal 
44. [d. at 780-81, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 195. 
45. [d. at 775, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 191. 
46. [d. at 780-81, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 194-95. 
47. E.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d I, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 
(1985) (death); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) 
(death); Newton v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 184 Cal. App. 3d 386, 228 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1986) 
(injury); Kossel v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1060, 231 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1986) (dis-
ease and death); Goodwin v. Reilley, 176 Cal. App. 3d 86, 221 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1985) 
(injury); Andalon v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1984) 
(injury); Sesma v. Cueto, 129 Cal. App. 3d 108, 181 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1982) (injury); Johnson 
v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 177 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1981) (injury); see also 
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) 
(misdiagnosis of disease). 
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found no grounds for making new tort law in the extraordinary 
perils of Pauline. 
Mary Ratcliff* 
* J.D., 1990, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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